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1 Introduction
Previous studies have established that dynamic indeterminacy can occur in two-sector
overlapping-generations (OLG) models with complicate preferences/technologies or the
consumption-good sector more capital-intensive than the investment-good sector. In this
paper, we argue that if agents select their occupation over skilled versus unskilled jobs
according to their learning ability, a two-sector OLG economy may exhibit dynamic inde-
terminacy under simple preference and technology specifications, regardless of the factor-
intensity rankings.
Specifically, we analyze a dynamic general-equilibrium model of occupational choice in
a two-sector overlapping-generations model populated with two-period lived agents. In our
economy, all agents are endowed with one unit of labor over the entirety of their lifetime.
They are identical in every respect except for the ability to learn. It is assumed that the
young who desire to be educated must self-finance the schooling expenses. As a result,
those with higher ability (or lower disutility in schooling) borrow when young to accom-
plish higher education and become skilled workers when old. For simplicity, we assume that
agents only consume in the second period, which implies forced savings in goods. Thus,
under a positive interest rate, those with lower ability (higher disutility) only work when
young, whose savings facilitate both education and physical capital investments. Endoge-
nous educational choice, therefore, gives rise to endogenous occupational choice between
borrowers (the to-be skilled) and lenders (the unskilled). Without loss of generality, it
is assumed that the ratio of the productivity of the skilled to that of the unskilled is a
constant exceeding one and that the production technologies of both the consumption and
the investment good sectors exhibit capital-skill complementarity.
By use of the analytical framework described above, we show that equilibrium dy-
namics with occupational choice may feature multiple converging transition paths so that
extrinsic uncertainty will aﬀect the dynamic behavior of the economy. In particular, even
with linear preferences, constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production technologies and a per-
fect credit market, we show that dynamic indeterminacy may arise, featuring a one or
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two-dimensional stable manifold in a system with two jump variables. This result holds
regardless of the factor-intensity rankings. Accordingly, occupational choice is the sole
source creating dynamic indeterminacy, as long as the two goods are not homogeneous.
Particularly, we show that by allowing occupational choice in our two-sector framework, we
add an additional choice variable which contributes to stabilize capital adjustments, due
to capital-skill complementarity and the associated changes in net savings. As a result,
the conventional condition on the factor intensity ranking is no longer needed for local
indeterminacy.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the study on complex dynamics in the overlapping generations
models. The majority of this literature has derived complex dynamics such as indetermi-
nacy, cycles and chaos depending either on the complicated preference structure or on the
specific restrictions on the production technologies. In the context of OLGmodels with cap-
ital accumulation, for example, Boldrin (1992) demonstrates that indeterminacy arises in
the presence of external increasing returns, while Reichlin (1986) finds that if labor-leisure
choice is allowed in a complex preference structure, indeterminacy and chaotic equilibrium
may emerge under constant returns technology.1 Michel and Venditti (1997) consider an
OLG model involving a utility function that is nonseparable over the life cycle and show
that dynamic indeterminacy can occur under the standard neoclassical technology. The
most related papers are the two-sector OLG frameworks with constant-returns technologies
by Galor (1992) and Reichlin (1992). They demonstrate that indeterminacy may occur if
the consumption-good sector uses capital more intensively than the investment good sec-
tor.2 In contrast to all previous OLG studies, dynamic indeterminacy can emerge in our
paper even under linear preferences and constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production tech-
1In the exchange economy models with overlapping generations, the possibility of endogenous fluctua-
tions entirely depends on the forms of the utilility functions; see, for example, Benhabib and Day (1982)
and Grandmont (1985). Jullien (1986) shows that the standard Diamond economy will exhibit cyclical
behavior if there are multiple state variables (money and capital).
2While Galor (1992) assumes that both production sectors have the standard neoclassical production
functions, Reichlin (1992) examines a two-secor model in the absence of factor substitution.
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nologies, without relying on any specific factor-intensity rankings. As a consequence, local
indeterminacy in our model mainly stems from the endogenous occupational choice of the
young — this alternative source of indeterminacy contributes to the existing literature.3
2 The Model
Consider a two-sector model where sector 1 manufactures the investment good (regarded
as the numeraire) and sector 2 produces the consumption good. The economy is populated
with two-period overlapping generations. There is a continuum of individual agents of
unit mass within each generational cohort, who are identical in every respect except for
their ability or disutility of acquiring education. Individual agents do not value leisure and
consume only in the second period of their lifetime. They have no initial wealth, but each
is endowed with one unit of time which can be supplied in one of the two periods of their
lifetime as a production input. In the absence of altruism, the utility function is simply
assumed linear in consumption when old.4
Agents are heterogeneous ex ante only in their disutility costs incurred in acquiring
education driven by the their innate abilities. Consider a particular agent born at time
t−1, whose consumption occurs at time t. We denote the disutility costs by αt−1 (in units
of the numeraire investment good), which are assumed to be uniformly distributed, i.e.,
αt−1 ∈ U [−², ²] with 0 < ² < ∞. Thus, a more able person will have less disutility from
acquiring education. We assume a pecuniary education costs of η ≥ ² > 0 per person (in
units of the investment good), where η ≥ ² ensures that no one will undertake education
3The literature of occupational choice within the dynamic general-equilibrium framework includes
Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Fender and Wang (2003), and many cited
therein. This literature builds upon a one-sector framework in which the dynamic properties of the equi-
librium have not been completely characterized.
4The assumption of one unit lifetime-endowment of labor is innocuous. The structure of two-period
lived agents who consumes only when old implies a one-to-one relationship between educational choice
and occupational choice (borrowers versus lenders). We will discuss the implications for relaxing this
assumption in the concluding section.
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for fun. Since an individual agent is not endowed with an initial wealth nor provided with
a bequest, the pecuniary cost of education must be financed by borrowing against his/her
future income. We assume throughout the paper that the credit market is perfect and
hence an individual agent who wishes to borrow is always granted with the education loan.
Denote the market (real) interest rate from period t−1 to t as rt and the corresponding
gross rate of interest as Rt ≡ 1 + rt. Given linear utility in second-period consumption,
an individual agent born at time t − 1 will undertake education to become skilled when
old if the benefit from earning a high-skilled wage in the second period, wH,t, net of the
disutility cost of education, αt−1, outweighs the costs from the sum of the foregone earnings
for an unskilled job in the first period, RtwL,t−1, and the (interest payment included) costs
of becoming educated, Rtη. Thus, the optimal schooling decision can be expressed as to
undertake education whenever: wH,t − αt−1 ≥ Rt(η + wL,t−1). Under proper assumption
(to be specified later), there is a critical value of αt−1, denoted α∗t−1, at which an agent is
indiﬀerent between undertaking education and remaining unskilled:
wH,t − α∗t−1 = Rt(η + wL,t−1). (1)
Should there exists such a critical point, agents of type αt−1 ∈ [−²,α∗t−1] will undertake
education and become skilled (type H) in the second period and those with αt−1 ∈ (α∗t−1, ²]
remain uneducated and work as unskilled (type L) in the first period. This gives rise to
an endogenous occupational choice under which a nontrivial fraction of agents become
borrowers (the educated) and the remainder become lenders (the unskilled). Notably,
although those who decide to work as unskilled when young save the entire wage income
(forced saving), such a saving decision is endogenously determined by occupational choice.
Within this stylized framework, it is assumed that skilled and unskilled workers are
fractional substitutes with one unit of skilled labor equivalent to δ > 1 units of unskilled
labor. Thus, letting `i,t represent aggregate employment of type i worker in period t
(i = L,H),the aggregate “eﬀective labor” can be expressed as: Nt = `L,t + δ`H,t. Free
mobility of labor between the two sectors implies that the unskilled and skilled wage rates
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can be expressed as:
wH,t = δWt = δwL,t. (2)
Denote Kt as the amount of capital available at the beginning of period t. Assume compet-
itive factor markets and 100 percent depreciation of the capital stock. Both consumption
and investment goods are produced using labor and capital with Cobb-Douglas technolo-
gies that exhibit constant returns. Under the eﬀective labor setup, it is easily seen that
our production technologies feature capital-skill complementarity (as an increase in δ leads
to a higher marginal product of capital).
Denote the relative price of the consumption good in units of the investment good as p.
Then, competitive profit conditions that equate the price with the unit cost in each sector
yield:
1 = Rθ1t W
1−θ1
t , (3)
pt = R
θ2
t W
1−θ2
t , (4)
where θi, i = 1, 2, are constant capital cost shares that take values between 0 and 1.
Assuming that θ1 6= θ2, we can solve (3) and (4) to obtain a unique pair of factor prices
(Rt, Wt) for any nonnegative pt, that is,
Rt = R(pt) and Wt =W (pt). (5)
The eﬀects of the relative price of goods on factor returns depend crucially on the factor-
intensity rankings. When the consumption good is produced using capital (labor) more
intensively, a higher relative price of the consumption good results in a higher (lower) return
on capital and lower (higher) wage rates for both the unskilled and the skilled. This is in
fact a straightforward application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to a three-factor model
with two factors that are fractionally substitutable (skilled labor and unskilled labor).
Let xt−1 denote the proportion of the generation born at time t− 1 who become edu-
cated. It follows that in labor market equilibrium, we have:
`H,t = xt−1, (6)
`L,t−1 = 1− xt−1. (7)
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It is straightforward to show that, with a uniform distribution of disutilities of education
across the population, xt−1 = (α∗t−1 + ²)/(2²), from which we obtain:
α∗t−1 = −(1− 2xt−1)², (8)
which provides a linear relationship between the proportion of the labor force which be-
comes educated and the critical value of disutility cost of education.
To close the model, we need to specify the goods market clearing conditions. The
aggregate consumption of type i at time t is given by,
CH,t = (wH,t −Rtη)xt−1/pt, (9)
CL,t = wL,t−1Rt(1− xt−1)/pt. (10)
Utilizing (2), (5), (9) and (10), we can write the demand for the consumption good in
period t as:
Cdt = {R(pt)(1− xt−1)W (pt−1) + [δW (pt)xt−1 − ηxt−1R(pt)]} /pt. (11)
Using the duality concepts, the supply of the consumption good at time t is equal to
Cst = R
0(pt)Kt +W 0(pt)(1− xt + δxt−1). (12)
Thus, the market-clearing condition for the consumption good at period t, Cst = C
d
t ,
implies:
pt [R
0(pt)Kt +W 0(pt)(1− xt + δxt−1)]
= R(pt)(1− xt−1)W (pt−1) + [δW (pt)xt−1 − ηxt−1R(pt)] . (13)
Finally, investment good market clearing is captured by:
Kt + ηxt−1 =W (pt−1)(1− xt−1), (14)
which equates the demand for loanable funds (the left-hand side) with the supply of loan-
able funds (the right-hand side).
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3 Steady-State Equilibrium
We are now ready to define dynamic competitive equilibrium and non-degenerate steady-
state equilibrium in our two-period OLG economy with endogenous educational choice.
Definition 1 A dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) is a tuple of positive quantities
{CH,t, CL,t, `H,t, `L,t, Kt, xt}, a tuple of positive prices {wH,t, wL,t, Rt, pt} and a critical
value α∗t ∈ [−², ²], such that (i) schooling is optimal: type αt−1 ∈ [−²,α∗t−1] become edu-
cated and type αt−1 ∈ (α∗t−1, ²] remain uneducated, where α∗t−1 satisfies (1); (ii) aggregate
consumption of the skilled and unskilled are determined by (9) and (10), respectively; (iii)
competitive profit conditions are given by (2), (3) and (4); (iv) allocation of labor across
sectors and labor market equilibrium are given by (6), (7) and (8); (v) goods market equi-
librium are achieved as in (13) and (14).
Definition 2 A non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium (NSSE) is a DCE represented by
a tuple {CH , CL, `H , `L,K, x, wH , wL, R, p,α∗} with all variables being constant over time.
In case when all variables take on their steady-state values, we drop time subscripts.
Although there are 11 endogenous variables in our system, the recursive nature of the
model enables us to summarize the system in terms of the sequence of the fraction of
the skilled and the relative price (i.e., {xt, pt}) alone. In particular, by combining the
market clearing condition for both the consumption and investment goods (13) and (14)
to eliminate the sequence of the capital stock {Kt}, we, on the one hand, have:
pt {R0(pt) [(1− xt−1)W (pt−1)− ηxt−1] +W 0(pt)(1− xt + δxt−1)}
= R(pt)(1− xt−1)W (pt−1) + δW (pt)xt−1 − ηxt−1R(pt). (15)
Under the Cobb-Douglas production technologies, the elasticities,
ptR
0(pt)
R(pt)
= −(1− θ1)
θ1 − θ2
≡ Θr and
ptW
0(pt)
W (pt)
=
θ1
θ1 − θ2
≡ Θw, (16)
are constant. It is clear that if the consumption good is more capital (resp. labor) intensive
than the investment good, i.e., if θ1 > (resp. <) θ2, then Θr < 0 and Θw > 1 (resp. Θr > 1
7
and Θw < 0). Using Θr and Θw, we can rewrite (15) to obtain a “goods market equilibrium
condition” (referred to as the EE locus):
(Θr−1)R(pt) [(1− xt−1)W (pt−1)− ηxt−1]+ΘwW (pt)(1−xt) = (1−Θw)δW (pt)xt−1. (17)
On the other hand, we can substitute (2), (5), and (8) into (1) to derive an “optimal
schooling relationship” (referred to as the SS locus):
δW (pt) + ²(1− 2xt−1) = R(pt)[η +W (pt−1)]. (18)
The EE and SS loci, (17) and (18), govern the dynamical system in the pair {xt, pt}.
In the steady state, xt = x and pt = p, which satisfy:
x =
½
1 +
[(1−Θw)δW (p) + η(Θr − 1)R(p)]
W (p)[R(p)(Θr − 1) +Θw]
¾−1
, (19)
x =
1
2
+
1
2²
{[δ −R(p)]W (p)− ηR(p)}. (20)
In general, an NSSE may not exist. However, if both ² and η are suﬃciently small and
if δ is above a critical value that depends on the values of elasticities θ1 and θ2, then
the steady-state equilibrium values of (x, p) are uniquely determined by (19) and (20).
Substituting these values into (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8), we obtain the steady-state
equilibrium values of factor prices (wH , wL and R), labor demand for each type ( `H and
`L) and the critical value of the disutility cost of education (α∗). Finally, utilizing (9), (10)
and (14), we obtain steady-state equilibrium consumption (CH and CL) and capital (K)
in a recursive manner. We can establish:
Theorem 1 The non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium of the dynamical system (17)
and (18) exists and is unique, if both ² and η are suﬃciently small.
Proof: First, as ² converges to zero, the graph of (20) on the (p, x)−plane converges to the
vertical line p = pe > 0, where pe is the solution to
R(p)η
W (p)
+R(p) = δ. (21)
Since both Θr and Θw are constant and either Θr < 0 and Θw > 1, or Θr > 1 and
Θw < 0 holds, pe uniquely exists that satisfies (21), irrespective of factor-intensity rankings.
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Substituting pe into (19), we see that the steady-state x also uniquely exists in the open
interval (0, 1). Finally, we note that (21) implies that 0 < R(pe) < δ and that as η converges
to zero, R(pe) converges to δ which is assumed to be greater than one. Therefore, it is
guaranteed that R(pe) is greater than one as long as both ² and η are suﬃciently small.
Q.E.D.
That is, in order to ensure an NSSE, the dispersion of heterogeneity and the pecuniary
costs of education cannot be too large whereas the productivity diﬀerential between the
skilled and the unskilled cannot be too small. One may have thought that these assump-
tions are restrictive. Standard numerical analyses (summarized in Tables 1A and 1B),
however, suggest that, over a large range of plausible parameter values, we can obtain a
unique NSSE even by allowing ² to be as high as 0.2 (recall that ² must be bounded by η)
and η to be as high as 0.3 (or more than 35 percent of the unskilled wage), where the value
of δ can be taken from 1.25 to 3.5 (or for the skilled wage to exhibit a 25 to 250 percent
markup over the unskilled wage).
It is interesting to examine that the eﬀects of a more favorable educational environment
(captured by either higher δ or lower η). For brevity, consider the simple case with ²
converging to zero in which the steady state values of (x, p) can be solved in a recursive
manner (i.e., p is determined by (21) alone). From (21), a more favorable educational
environment leads to a lower (higher) relative price of the consumption good in units of
the investment good if the consumption-good sector uses labor (capital) more intensively
than the investment-good sector. Regardless of the factor intensity ranking, however, the
return on capital always rises while the unskilled wage always falls in response to a favorable
change in undertaking education.
4 Equilibrium Dynamics
We are now prepared to characterize the dynamic properties of the steady-state equilibrium.
In order to gain intuition, let us start with two degenerate cases, one with no occupational
choice and another with only one sector (homogeneous consumption and investment goods).
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4.1 The Absence of Occupational Choice
Without occupational choice, we simply set xt = 0 (together with ² = η = 0). Then the
dynamical system reduces to:
Kt = Wt−1 (22)
(Θr − 1) eR(Wt)Wt−1 = −ΘwWt, (23)
where eR(Wt) = (Wt)−1−θ1θ1 is derived from the competitive profit condition (3). Substituting
(22) into (23) and manipulating it yield a single dynamic equation:
Kt+1 =
µ
1−Θr
Θw
¶θ1
(Kt)
θ1 . (24)
Since θ1 ∈ (0, 1) and 1−ΘrΘw > 0 regardless of the factor intensity rankings, capital evolves
monotonically and is stable. The existence and the uniqueness of a non-degenerate steady-
state equilibrium can thereby be established. Moreover, as Kt is a state variable, we can
conclude:
Theorem 2 If the steady-state equilibrium of the dynamical system (22) and (23) exists,
it is always locally determinate.
The result suggests that endogenous occupational choice plays an essential role for the
steady state to be locally indeterminate. The reader should be alerted that our framework
diﬀers from Galor (1992) because of the absence of endogenous saving decision once occu-
pational choice is removed. Thus, in this degenerate case, the steady state is always locally
determinate.
4.2 The Case of One-Sector Production
The next question to inquire is whether a steady state can be locally indeterminate when
the economy degenerates to one sector (i.e., θi = θ and pt = 1). The competitive profit
condition becomes: 1 = RθtW
1−θ
t ,which can be used to express Rt as a decreasing and
convex function of Wt:
Rt = Ω(Wt) ≡ (Wt)−
1−θ
θ , (25)
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Moreover, within this one-sector framework, the capital-labor ratio is given by,
Kt
(1− xt) + δxt−1
= − 1
Ω0(Wt)
. (26)
We can now rewrite the EE locus as:
Ω0(Wt)[Wt−1 − (η +Wt−1)xt−1] + [(1− xt) + δxt−1] = 0, (27)
whereas the SS becomes:
δWt + ²(1− 2xt−1)−Ω(Wt)(η +Wt−1) = 0. (28)
These two equations constitute the dynamical system for {xt,Wt}. Finally, the loanable
funds equilibrium (or the investment-good market clearing condition) is given by:
Kt + ηxt−1 =Wt−1(1− xt−1), (29)
which governs the evolution of the capital stock.
It is tedious but straightforward to show that if 1θ > δ > max
© θ
1−θ , 1 + η − ε
ª
, then
there exists a unique non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium in which a nontrivial fraction
of high- agents become unskilled workers and a nontrivial fraction of low-skilled agents
undertake education and become skilled workers.5 To characterize the dynamics of this
one-sector model of occupational choice, we begin by noting that under this one-sector
framework, {xt} and {Wt} are tied by a unique relationship (26), the factor market equi-
librium relationship, for any t. More specifically, for historically givenK0 and x−1, equation
(26) implies:
K0 = −
1
Ω0 (W0)
[(1− x0) + δx−1] . (30)
5This can be done by manipulating (27) and (28) in the steady state to obtain a single equation in
terms of W :
F (W ) =
1
2
(1 +
δW
²
)−
∙
1−Ω(W )(1− θ)/θ
1−Ω(W )(1− θ)/θ + ηΩ0(W )− δ +
Ω(W )(η +W )
2²
¸
= 0.
We can then use the mean value theorem to prove the existence of a unique root of F (W ) = 0 under the
required conditions. The detailed proof is available upon request.
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It implies that once x0 is chosen, the associated factor price W0 is determined by (30).
Thus, the system features only one free jump variable. If the steady state is a saddle point,
we have a unique equilibrium path converging to the steady state.
Theorem 3 (Characterization of the Dynamics) For suﬃciently small ² or η, the steady-
state equilibrium of the dynamical system (27) and (28) is locally determinate, featuring a
unique one-dimensional saddle path.
Proof: Totally diﬀerentiating (27) and (28), the Jacobian matrix of the one-sector model
evaluated at the steady-state value of (x,W ) is given by:
eJ =
⎡
⎣
2²
Z
[(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00 + Z Ω
Z
[(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00 + (1− x)Ω 0
2²
Z
Ω
Z
⎤
⎦ .
where Z ≡ δ − (η +W )Ω 0 > Ω > 1 (noting that Ω 0 < 0 < Ω 00). In the neighborhood of
the steady state, (1−x)W − ηx = −[(1−x)+ δx]/Ω 0 > 0. Straightforward manipulations
yields the trace and the determinant:
Tr( eJ) = 2²
Z
[(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00 + Z + Ω
Z
> 0,
Det( eJ) = Ω− 2²
Z
(1− x)Ω 0 > Ω > 1.
Evaluating the characteristic function at {−1, 1}, we have:
Λ(−1) = 1 + Tr( eJ) +Det( eJ) > 0
Λ(1) = − 1
Z
{(Z − Ω)(Z − 1) + 2²[(1− θ)(1− x)W − ηx]Ω 00} .
Therefore, if ² is suﬃciently small or if either η is not too large, then Λ (1) < 0 because
Z > Ω > 1. If this is the case, Λ
³eλ´ = 0 has two positive real roots, eλ1 and eλ2, which satisfy
0 < eλ1 < 1 < eλ2. As a result, the dynamical system holds a local saddle-point property
and, since only one of {xt,Wt} can jump freely, the steady state is locally determinate.
Q.E.D.
Although the above theorem relies on small values of ² or η, our numerical exercises
reported in Table 2 suggest that even with fairly large values ² or η over a large range of
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plausible parameter values, the saddle-point stability property is quite robust. Therefore,
despite endogenous occupational choice, dynamic indeterminacy in general cannot arise if
the OLG economy features only one sector that produces a single homogeneous good.
4.3 The General Setup
We now turn to examining the stability properties in the general two-sector setup with
endogenous occupational choice. To begin, we claim that given the initial value K0, both
x0 and p0 can be chosen freely in our two-sector dynamical system. To see this, notice that
at t = 0, equation (14) does not restrict the choice of x0 and p0 (because only x−1 and p−1
are involved).6 By expressing equations (14), (17) and (18) at t = 1, we have:
K1 + ηx0 = W (p0)(1− x0),
(1−Θw)δW (p1)x0 = (Θr − 1)R(p1) [(1− x0)W (p0)− ηx0] +ΘrW (p1)(1− x1),
δW (p1) + ²(1− 2x0) = R(p1)[η +W (p0)].
Obviously, there are five endogenous variables, x0, p0, x1, p1 and K1, implying that these
three equations do not restrict the choice of x0 and p0, either. Throughout t = 2, 3, ...,
this argument continues to hold true. In other words, x and p are “jump variables” whose
initial values can be chosen freely.
Then, denote J as the Jacobian matrix of the linearized 2× 2 dynamical system evalu-
ated at the steady-state value of (x, p) and Jij as the (i, j)’s element of J . Total diﬀeren-
tiation of (19) and (21) gives:
J11 =
1
ΘwW
∙
2²
B
Q− (1−Θw)δW − (Θr − 1) (η +W )R
¸
,
J12 =
1
ΘwW
RW 0
B
[Q+B(Θr − 1)(1− x)] ,
J21 =
2²
B
,
J22 =
RW 0
B
,
6At t = 0, the behavior of the initial old is passive where the good market equilibrium condition and
the optimal schooling relationship are not well-defined.
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where Q ≡ (Θr − 1)[(1 − x)W − ηx]R 0 + [Θw(1 − x) − (1 − Θw)δx]W 0 > 0 and B ≡
δW 0 − (η +W )R 0 < (>) 0 if θ1 < (>) θ2.
As ² converges to zero, so does J21, implying that the characteristic equation converges
to:
Λ(x) ≡
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ λ− J11 −J12
0 λ− J22
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = 0. (31)
In view of (31), we find the following:
Theorem 4 If a non-degenerate steady-state equilibrium of the dynamical system (17)
and (18) exists, then for suﬃciently small ², it is locally indeterminate, regardless of the
factor intensity rankings.
Proof: From (31), as ² converges to zero, one root converges to J11 and another to J22.
Using the definition of Θw and Θr and applying the steady-state SS locus, we can derive:
J22 =
ΘwpRW
δΘwpW − (η +W )ΘrpR
=
θ1RW
θ1δW − (θ2 − 1)(η +W )R
=
θ1W
η +W
∈ (0, 1).
Thus, one root (denoted λ1) is positive and within the unit circle. Similarly, taking ²→ 0,
we can manipulate J11 to obtain:
J11 =
− [(1−Θw)δW + (Θr − 1) (η +W )R]
ΘwW
=
θ2δW + (1− θ2) (η +W )R
θ1W
=
δ
θ1
> 1,
implying another root (denoted λ2) is positive but outside the unit circle. Since both x
and p are jump variables, the dynamical system is locally indeterminate. Q.E.D.
When ² is not small, the underlying dynamic properties become too complicated to
be characterized analytically. Accordingly, we perform numerical exercises to show the
robustness of our results. Although we have examined many cases with various parameter
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values, we report the most informative ones in Tables 1A and 1B, for the two cases where
the consumption-good production is more capital- or labor-intensive.7 In the benchmark
cases, we select the skill markup as δ = 2.5, and the ability diﬀerential and the pecuniary
cost of education as 2² = η = 0.2. The capital cost shares in the two sectors are chosen as
0.2 and 0.3, respectively. These parameter values give a steady-state fraction of the skilled
as x = 0.53 (0.58) and the steady-state gross rate of interest as 2.01 (1.96) for the case
where the consumption-good production uses capital (labor) more intensively. Again, we
impose the constraints: η ≥ ² and δ > R > 1. Thus, we perturb 2² from 0.1 to 0.4, η from
0.1 to 0.3 (with η ≥ ²) and δ from 1.25 to 3.5 (consistent with dynamic eﬃciency). Our
results indicate that for these plausible parameters, the dynamical system is always locally
indeterminate, with a positive stabilizing root and another positive root outside the unit
circle.
In summary, we have established the local indeterminacy property regardless of the
factor intensity rankings, contrasting sharply with the stability condition obtained in the
standard two-sector OLG model without occupational choice where the steady state may
be indeterminate only when the consumption-good sector is more capital intensive than
the investment good sector (cf. Galor 1992 and Reichlin 1992). A natural question arises:
what are the underlying forces giving rise to dynamic indeterminacy?
From Theorems 2 and 3, it is clear that in a standard OLG framework without compli-
cate preference/technology specifications, dynamic indeterminacy cannot arise if occupa-
tional choice is absent or if it features only one sector that produces a single homogeneous
good. In the one sector case, there are lack of reinforcing forces in which the price dynamics
(factor prices) are purely driven by the dynamics of the capital stock and the steady-state
becomes a saddle. Under a two-sector setup with independent price dynamics, the con-
ventional condition on the factor intensity ranking (for the consumption-good sector to
be more capital intensive) ensures that not only the price but the quantity dynamics are
stable in the absence of occupational choice.
7For example, we have experimented a wide range of {θ1, θ2}, with |θ1 − θ2| as small as 0.001 and as
large as 0.5, and found that our results are robust.
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By allowing occupational choice in such a two-sector overlapping-generations setting,
we add an additional choice variable which contributes to stabilize capital adjustments.
More specifically, due to capital-skill complementarity, an increase in the proportion of the
population who are skilled raises the capital rental, which is a stabilizing force. Moreover,
as the mass of the skilled increases, the aggregate costs of education increase whereas
the loanable funds supply decreases. Both of these reduce net savings and hence capital
investment, which again help stabilize capital adjustments. As a result, the conventional
condition on the factor intensity rankings is no longer needed for local indeterminacy.
Finally, one may inquire whether the factor intensity rankings matter at all for dynamic
adjustments. Let focus on the case with suﬃciently concentrated distribution of ability
(² small). In this case, the local dynamics feature a one-dimensional stable manifold over
two jump variables (which can be expressed as xt = φ(pt)). Consider that, at a particular
period, agents expect the long-run relative price of consumption to be higher (p increases).
When the consumption sector is more capital intensive, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem im-
plies that the returns to capital must go up more than proportionately whereas the returns
to labor must go down. As a result, the capital stock rises and the occupational choice
is in favor of being unskilled (x decreases). Thus, along the transition path, there will be
downward adjustments in x associated with upward adjustments in p (i.e., φ0 < 0). When
the consumption sector is more labor intensive, the transition path will feature upward
adjustments in both x and p (i.e., φ0 > 0). Summarizing, although the factor intensity
rankings do not aﬀect the stability properties, they matter for the configuration of the un-
derlying dynamic adjustments. Moreover, the configuration of such dynamic adjustments
in the relative price and occupational choice help justify why dynamic indeterminacy can
arise, driven by self-fulfilling prophecies.8
8More precisely, updating the SS locus by one period and applying the stable manifold relationship,
we get: [η +W (pt)]R(pt+1) − δW (pt+1) = ²(1 − 2φ(pt)). When the consumption sector is more capital
intensive (θ1 < θ2), an expected increase in pt+1 (sunspot driven) raises the LHS. Since φ0 < 0, an raise
in pt can change occupational choice to restore the equilibrium relationship. Since dpt+1/dpt > 0, such an
increase in pt leads to an increase in pt+1 and hence the expectations are fulfilled. The case of θ1 > θ2 can
be worked out by similar arguments, where R0 < 0, W 0 > 0 and φ0 > 0.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a two-sector overlapping-generations model with endogenous
occupational choice where borrowing is required for investment in education. We have
demonstrated that the economy may involve indeterminacy of converging paths, implying
that expectations-driven, endogenous fluctuations can emerge. In our model the utility
function is linear in consumption in the old age, the production technologies take the
Cobb-Douglas functional forms with constant returns, and the credit market is perfect.
Therefore, dynamic indeterminacy in our economy mainly stems from the presence of
occupational choice behavior of the agents, though the two-sector structure is essential for
the result.
A natural question to inquire is what if we generalize the borrower-lender relationship.
In our benchmark economy, we have assumed that the agents to be educated are borrowers
and the agents who do not plan to be educated are lenders. This is because all agents
are assumed to be two-period lived and to consume only in their old age. If we consider
instead three-period lived agents who consume in both the second and the third periods,
there need not be a one-to-one relationship between educational decision (educated versus
uneducated) and occupational choice (borrowers versus lenders). Such a generalization
involves a more complicate preference structure and intertemporal reinforcing forces, thus
increasing the likelihood of dynamic indeterminacy as one would expect.
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